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THE INTERROGATED JUVENHEL:
CAVEAT CONFESSOR?
The plight of the arrested juvenile left to defend his own rights
when confronted by imposing police interrogators is one of the critical
issues in post-Gault1 juvenile law. A young suspect may be taken off
the street or may be arrested at home at an odd hour if the suspected
offense is sufficiently serious.2 He is then booked at the station house,
given his Miranda' warnings, and asked if he will waive his constitu-
tional rights. During this process the youth ponders to the best of
his ability the pros and cons of cooperating. If he is uncertain of what
to do without outside help or is reluctant to talk immediately, he must
find some manner of expressing himself which will make clear his de-
sire to assert his fundamental rights. The continued interrogation of
a suspect who has invoked his constitutional rights is coercive by law,4
but the coerciveness of the interrogation may be obscured by the inabil-
ity of a frightened juvenile to express his desire to assert his rights.
The recent California Supreme Court decision of People v. Bur-
ton' related to the problem of coerced juvenile confessions and at-
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was a landmark decision by the United
States Supreme Court which provided that despite the civil nature of juvenile court pro-
ceedings, minors were entitled to certain basic constitutional rights: notification of
charges, notification of the right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross exami-
nation, and privilege against self-incrimination.
2. Many cases illustrate this practice with respect to particular defendants. See,
e.g., People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 379, 491 P.2d 793, 795, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1971)
(7 A.M.); In re White, 160 So. 2d 344 (La. 1964) (5:15 A.M.); In re William L., 29
App. Div. 2d 182, 183, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220, appeal denied, 236 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1968) (3-4 A.M.); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 219 Pa. Super. 459, 460-61,
281 A.2d 685, 687 (1971) (4 A.M.).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A verbatim reproduction of the
Miranda warnings as read to juveniles in one city is reproduced in Wren, The Miranda
Doctrine and Juvenile Court, 18 Juv. Cr. JUDGES 1. 114 (1968). That form reads in
part: "At this time it is my duty to inform you of the rights that you possess while in
custody. Under the law, you cannot be compelled to answer, and you have the right
to refuse to answer any questions asked of you while you are in custody. If you do an-
swer such questions, the answers given by you will be used against you in a trial in a
court of law at some later date .... Do you understand this?
ANSWER OF ACCUSED: "
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966); People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.
2d 714, 718-19, 441 P.2d 625, 237, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (1968).
5. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
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tempted to secure a meaningful application to minors of their full
Miranda rights. Burton held that a minor's request to see his father
prior to interrogation was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right
against self incrimination. 6 To the extent that the Burton decision at-
tends to the spirit rather than to the technicalities of Miranda rights, it
represents a laudable step toward affording substantive protection to
juveniles.
Burton's shortcoming lies in its failure to fashion a clear test of
what elements of juvenile behavior should be considered an implicit
invocation of Miranda rights. Although the decision implies that the
police and courts should strain to recognize any expression of hesitancy
from a juvenile, it leaves open the question of how broad a range of
behavior will be recognized as an invocation of the right to silence.
Defense attorneys with youthful clients may be able to argue success-
fully that the Burton decision should not be constrained by its facts.
In Burton the minor requested to see his father, but what if a juvenile
asks to see an older sister who has always mothered him? Or a more
experienced friend? What about expressions of fatigue or illness? It
could be further argued, in the tradition of Gault, that both considera-
tion of a delinquent's rehabilitation and recognition of the inherent un-
trustworthiness of a subtly coerced juvenile confession make a broad
interpretation of Burton a social imperative. Both the legal and psy-
chological literature reviewed below indicate that juveniles are in need
of zealous protection of their fundamental right to be free from coercive
interrogation.
Miranda Implementation for Juveniles
The California Supreme Court naturally has looked to the Miranda
decision for guidance on the issue of coercive interrogations. The Mir-
anda lesson is twofold; not only must the police warn a suspect of his
constitutional rights and obtain a waiver of them prior to eliciting a
confession, 7 but they also must completely halt all questioning regard-
less of the formal waiver if the suspect asserts his right to silence or
right to an attorney in any manner at any time." The best known
aspect of the comprehensive Miranda ruling is the requirement that
the police must warn the suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used against him, and that he may
insist upon the presence of an attorney. Juveniles in California have
a statutory right to receive these Miranda warnings9 and are consid-
6. Id. at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
8. Id. at 444-45.
9. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 625 (West 1972). For a discussion of the
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ered competent to waive their constitutional rights unless there are cir-
cumstances which disprove that competence. 10 California has not seen
fit to declare that all juveniles are incompetent as a matter of law to
waive their rights; the courts have instead adhered to the "totality of
the circumstances" rule to determine competence for juveniles as for
adults." The circumstance of being a juvenile is simply one important
factor under consideration.
An equally important but less famous aspect of the Miranda dic-
tate provides that even if the suspect has given a formal waiver, cus-
todial interrogators must respect other less explicit invocations of con-
stitutional rights. The Supreme Court said that if the suspect indicates
"in any manner and at any stage of the [interrogation] process" that
he wants to consult with an attorney, there can be no further question-
ing.1 2 Thus, the Court has provided for the termination of interrogation
when the suspect engages in either of at least two types of behavior: (1)
refusing to grant a formal waiver, and (2) requesting to consult with
an attorney. The Court then adds to this list a less specific third cate-
gory of behavior by the accused which must terminate the interroga-
tion. Miranda continues, "Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated,
the police may not question him."'13 There is no indication of what
specific kinds of behavior this third category of other invocations might
include, but this comprehensive third category is arguably broad enough
to encompass a wide range of words and acts by the accused.
Subsequent rulings by the California Supreme Court have seized
upon this third comprehensive Miranda category and have emphasized
that no specific form of words or conduct is required for adults to in-
yoke the constitutional privilege of silence.' 4  Moreover, California has
held that the invocation need not be made with unmistakable clarity.15
post-Gault legislative implementation of the Miranda safeguards in California see Gard-
ner, Gault and California, 19 HAsTNGs L . 527, 532-39 (1968).
10. "[A] minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, even of capital
offenses, without the presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, and
the admissibility of such a confession depends not on his age alone but on a combina-
tion of that factor with such other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experi-
ence, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement." People v.
Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 383, 432 P.2d 202, 215, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 599 (1967).
11. See In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 462-63, 450 P.2d 296, 307, 75 Cal. Rptr.
1, 12 (1969), reaffirming the Lara approach.
12. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
13. Id. at 445.
14. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 955, 464 P.2d 114, 118, 83 Cal. Rptr.
658, 662 (1970); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 535-36, 450 P.2d 580, 587-88, 75
Cal. Rptr. 188, 195-96 (1969).
15. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 955, 464 P.2d 114, 118, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658,
662 (1970).
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For a suspect of any age, the desire to remain silent may be commu-
nicated by refusing to sign a waiver, 6 by asking the police to telephone
a relative who will contact an attorney,' 7 or simply by telephoning an
attorney himself.' 8 In People v. Randall9 the court enunciated a very
broad test for the qualification of nonexplicit behavior as an invocation
of constitutional rights. The test is whether the behavior of the ac-
cused "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness on
the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with
police at that time."2 In Randall this broad present willingness test
was used to determine that the act of telephoning an attorney was an
invocation of the suspect's Fifth Amendment right to silence, regard-
less of his formal waiver of that right.
Burton and Beyond
In Burton the court reaffirmed the Randall present willingness
test and applied it in the case of a juvenile who requested to see his
father. Weighing the factor of the youthfulness of the accused, the
court concluded that the request amounted to an invocation of the
Fifth Amendment right.2 Burton thereby has made the circumstance
of being a juvenile an important one with respect to the implementation
of all the Miranda requirements in California; youthfulness must now
be considered not only in respect to assessing the minor's competence
to give a formal waiver of his rights,22 but also with regard to any less
explicit invocation of his constitutional privileges.
In Burton a sixteen year old murder suspect was awakened and
arrested at his home by several police officers early in the morning.
He was taken to the station house where he was booked and, after
some delay, interrogated. Sometime during the booking and delay pe-
riod the boy asked if he could see his father and was told that he
could not. In the meantime, his father had arrived at the station and
similarly was denied access to his son. The younger Burton was then
secluded in another room for interrogation, where he formally waived
his constitutional rights following the Miranda warnings. 23  The en-
suing confession, which originally was used against him in his criminal
16. People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 719, 441 P.2d 625, 627, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817,
819 (1968).
17. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 536, 450 P.2d 580, 588, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188,
196 (1969).
18. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 958, 464 P.2d 114, 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658,
664 (1970).
19. 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970).
20. id. at 956, 464 P.2d at 119, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
21. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 383-84, 491 P.2d 793, 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1,
6 (1971).
22. See note 10 supra.
23. 6 Cal. 3d at 379-81, 491 P.2d at 795-96, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4.
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trial,24 was held to be inadmissible by the California Supreme Court.
The decision notes, "It appears to us most likely and most normal that
a minor who wants help on how to conduct himself with the police and
wishes to indicate that he does not want to proceed without such help
would express such desire by requesting to see his parents. 28  The
court therefore held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a
request by a minor to see his parents must be construed as an invoca-
tion of his Fifth Amendment right of silence.26
The language in Burton leads to uncertainty as to whether the court
was looking for any kind of behavior which indicated the juvenile's
hesitancy to cooperate with the police, or whether it was significant
that the court perceived the boy's request to see his father as analogous
to an adult's request to see an attorney. The court observed, "[f]or
adults, removed from the protective ambit of parental guidance, the
desire for help naturally manifests in a request for an attorney. For
minors, it would seem that the desire for help naturally manifests in a
request for parents. ' -7 Such language strongly suggests that the paral-
lel between father and attorney is very important in this case. If so,
then cases where a juvenile expresses a desire to see someone other
than a parent, or expresses a desire for relief of a physical need such
as sleep or food prior to questioning, are likely to be distinguished.
It is arguable, however, that the analogy between an adult's re-
questing to see an attorney and a minor's requesting to see his father
was not critical in the disposition of Burton. Burton was expressly
based on the Fifth Amendment right to silence rather than the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.28 Moreover, the court specifically used
the Randall present willingness test. Application of that test to the
Burton facts revealed that a juvenile's request to see his father amounted
to conduct which "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present will-
ingness. . . to discuss his case freely and completely ... ." Under
this interpretation, a variety of words and acts by an accused juvenile
should qualify as invocations of the Fifth Amendment right to silence,
regardless of whether the conduct is strictly analogous to requesting an
attorney.
Burton as a Tool for Equal Protection
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority in In re Gault, expressed
24. While Burton's confession was used for a criminal trial rather than a juve-
nile proceeding, the defendant was a sixteen year old at the time of the confession.
Id. at 378, 491 P.2d at 794, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
25. Id. at 382, 491 P.2d at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
26. Id. at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
27. Id. at 382, 491 P.2d at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
28. Id. at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6
29. Id. at 382, 491 P.2d at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
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concern that juvenile cases are essentially treated as adult criminal cases
in juvenile courts, yet without the procedural safeguards constitutionally
guaranteed to adults. As a result, Gault required some procedural
changes for juveniles in the adjudicatory stage, including the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination.3" With Burton, the
California Supreme Court is attempting to alleviate the plight of the
juvenile in the pre-judicial stage by affording him meaningful protec-
tion of his newly gained rights.
The approach of the California Supreme Court in Burton reflects
a Gault awareness of the procedural plight of juveniles. Burton was
decided along the strict Miranda guidelines designed for adults, yet
with a special recognition of a juvenile's difficulties of self-expression.
If subsequent decisions do not limit Burton to cases where the juven-
ile's behavior is analogous to an adult's request to see an attorney, Cali-
fornia will have taken a significant step toward affording juveniles more
substantive protection of their right not to be compelled to incriminate
themselves during interrogations.
A recent New Jersey decision also has tried to achieve meaningful
protection for juveniles in the pre-judicial stage. The test enunciated
in In re R. W. 31 is whether the interrogation was "conducted with the
utmost fairness, without force or other improper influence, mental or
physical, and in accordance with the highest standards of due process
and fundamental fairness."32 This notion of "fundamental fairness"
has long been used as a shibboleth in juvenile law, but the test is an
elusive one. Fundamental fairness is more a description of the court's
conclusion than an operational test. California's present willingness
test, which was formulated in Randall and approved in Burton, pro-
vides more guidance to police and lower courts on how to determine
whether the suspect has made an invocation of his rights. The present
willingness test focuses upon observable behavior by the accused rather
than upon an abstract condition of fairness. Following Randall, the
police and courts are given a focal point; whenever the accused indi-
cates a need or desire for help, it must be decided whether this act or
these words reflect a lack of present willingness to talk. If so, then
further interrogation is coercive by law.
The Randall Test and Subtle Coercion
The importance of such an operational test for coercion is appar-
ent in the psychological literature on persuasion. Experimental evi-
dence, such as the data reviewed below, has shown that coercion is
30, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
31. In re R.W., 115 N.J. Super. 286, 279 A.2d 709 (App. Div.), cert. granted, 59
N.J. 289, 281 A.2d 802 (1971).
32. Id. at 296, 279 A.2d at 714.
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extremely difficult to detect in some situations. It therefore is desir-'
able that a legal test for coercion be derived from identifiable behavior
which can provide some concrete measure of the presence or absence
of undue influences.
A psychologist studying irrational obedience to authority concludes
that our culture may not provide adequate models for refusing to com-
ply with the wishes of an authority figure when compliance is against
one's own judgment.33 In his experiments, subjects knew that they
would not lose their compensation for participating even if they re-
fused to perform an anxiety provoking task, yet subjects overwhelm-
ingly acquiesced.3 4 A typical subject's dilemma is described:
Despite his numerous, agitated objections, which were constant ac-
companiments to his actions, the subject unfailingly obeyed the
experimenter . . . Although at the verbal level he had re-
solved not to go on, his actions were fully in accord with the
experimenter's commands . . . [Hie found it an extremely dis-
agreeable task, but he was unable to invent a response that would
free him from [the experimenter's] authority. Many subjects can-
not find the specific verbal formula that would enable them to re-
ject the role assigned to them by the experimenter. 5
This inability to find appropriate verbal expression for terminating a
stressful encounter may similarly hinder a suspect in the exercise of his
right to terminate an interrogation. If the police are insistent with him,
even after the reading of his Miranda rights, he may comply unwill-
ingly. His unsuccessful attempts to express his desire to terminate the
encounter then become significant as an indicator of his real wishes,
despite his obedience.
It is not even necessary for the police to be heavy-handed with an
authoritative request to confess. Coercion can be extremely effective
even when it is very subtly generated. For example, another psycho-
logical study16 involved persuading subjects to volunteer to cooperate
with other individuals who were humiliating, anxiety provoking or oth-
erwise unpleasant. It was important to the experimenters that the sub-
jects believed that their choice was freely made, yet these psychologists
realized that most people do not willingly enter into hostile interactions.
33. Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18
HUMAN RELATIONS 57, 67 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Milgram, Conditions].
34. The Milgram experiments, designed to test the extent of obedience to au-
thority, required subjects to shock a helpless victim with increasing voltage under the
pretext that the psychologist was studying the effect of punishment on learning. For a
detailed description of the procedure and results see Milgram, Behavioral Study of
Obedience, 67 J. ABNORM. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 371-78 (1963).
35. Milgram, Conditions, supra note 33, at 67.
36. Firestone, Insulted and Provoked: The Effects of Choice and Provocation
on Hostility and Aggression, in THE CoGNrniva CONTROL OF MOTIVATION 229 (P.
Zimbardo ed. 1969).
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The technique for manipulation of "choice" was therefore very subtle.
The experimenters simply were very insistent about how much they
would appreciate the cooperation and said things such as, "I don't know
whether you want to do it, but in any case, it's completely up to you."37
Despite the low keyed nature of this tactic, eighty percent of the sub-
jects acquiesced. In this simple manner, an insistent authority figure
can coerce many people to make an irrational "choice" to comply
with the authority's wishes.3"
If a court were to examine the fundamental fairness of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the choice made in this psychological experi-
ment, it is doubtful that the powerfully coercive, yet extremely subtle,
tactics employed by the experimenters would be readily detected. A
tactic, however, which succeeds in making eight out of ten people in
the experimental situation choose an irrational alternative must be con-
sidered an "improper [mental] influence," in the words of the New
Jersey court.39
A California court using the Randall present willingness test might
be more successful in detecting this subtle coercion. Since the coercive
37. Id. at 236.
38. Other experiments involving a manipulation of choice have similarly found that
subjects can be induced to do disagreeable things, even to undergo physical pain, for
very little justification. For example:
(1) In one experiment individuals who had previously indicated a disapproval of the
"use of electric shock on humans for scientific purposes" were induced to administer
such shock on humans. The inducement was minimal, and the subject's own respon-
sibility for participating or leaving was emphasized. Despite the subjects' aversion
to the task, and despite the explicit choice they were given, 97% of the subjects were
successfully coerced into cooperation. Furthermore, a subsequent rating the subjects
made of their perceived degree of choice showed that they felt they had almost com-
plete choice in participation. In other words, not only could 97% of the subjects be per-
suaded to do something they disapproved of doing, but they felt they had done so
voluntarily. Glass & Wood, The Control of Aggression by Self-Esteem and Dissonance,
in THE COGNITIVE CONTROL OF MOTIVATION 207 (P. Zimbardo ed. 1969).
(2) Subjects who had already been deprived of breakfast and lunch one day, and who
were therefore hungry, were persuaded to continue fasting until eight or nine o'clock in
the evening. There was little incentive for enduring further hunger. The experi-
menter simply said, "[D]on't think you have to come this evening. But we would
appreciate your help. If, however, you don't feel like doing it, that's okay because we
can get someone else to do it." Nonetheless, 82% of these hungry people agreed to un-
dergo the ordeal of further food deprivation. Brehm, Modification of Hunger by Cogni-
tive Dissonance, in THE COGNITIVE CONTROL OF MOTIVATION 22 (P. Zimbardo ed.
1969).
(3) Thirsty people can be coerced into enduring further thirst without much in-
centive. One experiment found that 75% of the subjects asked to cooperate did so agree,
despite the warning that they would be "very uncomfortable". Brehm, Commitment to
Thirst: The Cognitive Camel Complex, in THE COGNITIVE CONTROL OF MOTIVATION 55
(P. Zimbardo ed. 1969).
39. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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tactic was based upon authoritative insistence, one important indicator
of the presence of the coercion would be any hesitancy expressed by
the individual subject. The Randall test would direct attention to any
such expression of hesitancy. If the individual were a juvenile, Burton
would have the court considering whether there were any characteris-
tically juvenile expressions of unwillingness. In this manner, the ex-
tremely subtle coercion used in the psychological experiment, or a crim-
inal interrogation, might be more readily detected by an observant
court.
When it is seen how readily a subject in an experiment can be
coerced into enduring a hostile interpersonal interaction from which
he has nothing to gain, it is not surprising that only very few suspects
refuse to talk with police interrogators even after the suspects are told
they do not have to talk. A survey of actual station house interroga-
tions, the Yale Interrogation Study,40 reported that the detectives used
phrases such as "You don't have to say a word, but you ought to get
everything cleared up," or "You don't have to say anything, of course,
but can you explain how. . . ."'I The striking similarity to the low
keyed tactic used in the psychological experiment is noteworthy. The
mechanism of subtle persuasion by authoritative insistence could be op-
erating in the station house as in the laboratory.
The particular vulnerability of juveniles to subtly coercive tactics
has not been unnoticed by the courts. The United States Supreme
Court said in Gallegos in 1962:
The prosecution says that the boy was advised of his right to
counsel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his
parents. But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is
unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when
he is made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal
with a person who is not equal to the police... and who is unable
to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits
of his constitutional rights. 42
The Court's belief that the young are especially susceptible to coercion
is supported by other evidence. It has been found that the charac-
teristics of suspects most likely to be susceptible to police interrogation
tactics are previous inexperience with the police, passivity, and low so-
cial status. 3  A sociologist finds that "low status persons-those who
have never enjoyed a secure or rewarding social position-are likely to
be the most vulnerable of all to [police] indoctrination . . . ,,44 Al-
40. Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J
1519 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Yale Interrogation Study].
41. Id. at 1552.
42. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
43. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. Rav.
42, 56 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Driver].
44. Id. at 48.
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though a suspect of any age may possess these characteristics, the
typical inexperience, passivity, and low social status of the young en-
hances their susceptibility to coercion as a group.
Another contributor to the vulnerability of some minors undergo-
ing interrogation is the effect of drugs they may have taken prior to
their arresta 5 A self-report study of juveniles institutionalized for de-
linquency reveals that forty percent claimed they had been under the
influence of drugs or alcohol at the time they were interrogated by the
police. 6 The effect of such intoxication at the time of questioning is
uncertain, but at least one experiment indicated that some drugs tend
to make some individuals confess to real or imagined crimes.17
The Illusory Power of Nonwaiver
There are other pressures on a juvenile suspect which make it
likely that he will formally waive his constitutional rights even if he
does not want to do so. Ferster and Courtless' article on the disposi-
tion of arrested juveniles shows that one of the most critical factors de-
termining how a child's case will be handled is the impression he
makes on the police when he is detained. 8 Nearly half of the minors
arrested never reach either juvenile or criminal court, but are either re-
leased or referred to welfare or police agencies. 9 The police's deci-
sion usually is not based solely on the severity of the offense, but on an
assessment of the personal characteristics of the child and his general
demeanor. A showing of respect and repentance is particularly impor-
tant."° A refusal to waive his constitutional rights after the reading of
the Miranda warnings obviously would be incompatible with a coop-
erative attitude. Since cooperation and a contrite demeanor are impor-
tant for an early favorable disposition of the minor's case, nonwaiver
would not appear to be in the juvenile's immediate interest.
45. It was contended by the defendant in Burton, for example, that the boy was
under the influence of drugs at the time of his arrest and consequently could not under-
stand what was being said to him. Brief for Appellant at 2, People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d
375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
46. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 39, 52
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Ferguson & Douglas]. It should be noted that this statistic
is based upon a self-report study only and is not otherwise proven. On the other hand,
the problem of the possible unreliability of confessions given while the suspect is under
the influence of drugs may be far more serious than this unsystematic sample indicates.
47. Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Crim-
inal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315, 318-19 (1953). The drugs used in this experi-
ment, however, were sodium pentothal and sodium amytal, commonly known as "truth
serums." The phenomenon may not generalize to other drugs.
48. Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and
the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REv. 567, 578-79 (1969).
49. Id. at 572.
50. Id. at 579.
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Moreover, children appreciate the fact that cooperation will bene-
fit them during interrogations, as shown by the Ferguson and Douglas
study. The researchers interviewed both nondelinquent children who
had never been arrested and delinquent children who had been insti-
tutionalized by juvenile courts. When asked if they felt it would be
"better" to talk to the police in interrogations, seventy-four percent of
the delinquents and ninety-three percent of the nondelinquents an-
swered yes.51
The suggestion of these two studies taken together is that since
nonwaiver is contrary to the short term goal of getting released, there
is an internal pressure not to exercise that power. A child desperately
may want the interrogation to cease, but he also may want to appear
cooperative because he feels, not without cause, that it will be better
to talk. This internal pressure which the juvenile suspect feels, com-
bined with the degree of external pressure which can be so subtly gen-
erated by the police, makes nonwaiver an unlikely phenomenon. The
Ferguson and Douglas experiment confirms this conclusion. In their
experiment, ninety delinquent and nondelinquent children who were
unaware that they were participating in an interrogation experiment
were summoned for questioning. They were given the Miranda warn-
ings in various forms and were asked to waive their rights. More than
ninety-five percent of these juveniles then voluntarily waived their con-
stitutional rights.52
Dangers Inherent in Coercive Interrogations
In re Gault held that juveniles have the right to the protection of
the Fifth Amendment in juvenile court proceedings because (1) con-
fessions which are the "mere fruits of fear or coercion" may be un-
trustworthy 53 and (2) the equality of the individual and the state must
be maintained.54 In response to the contention that the state should
proceed with juveniles only in the manner of a concerned guardian,
Justice Fortas wrote for the majority, "[t]he Latin phrase [parens pa-
triae] proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the
exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning
is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance." 55  Fur-
ther, "[it would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-in-
crimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.
' 56
Gault, then, can be said to stand for the proposition that the informal
51. Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 46, at 51.
52. Id. at 53.
53. 387 U.S. 1, 47.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 47.
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procedure appropriate for disciplining a child in everyday conduct is
not appropriate when handling a child within the machinery of law en-
forcement.
Empirical evidence indicates that Gault considerably understated
the argument in favor of protecting children from self-incrimination at
any stage of their cases. Sociologist Edwin Driver believes that the
subtle forces operating even in post-Miranda interrogations are "at least
equal to physical duress in influencing behavior." 7  Driver observes:
Evidence from the field of group dynamics suggests that the isola-
tion of interrogation may influence ideas and behaviors. In a
lengthy interrogation, the continued isolation of the suspect from
his friends and relatives may begin to tell, for maintenance of atti-
tudes, beliefs, and opinions requires support from one's fellows.
• . . As the interrogation continues the suspect may become un-
certain about his feelings toward the police, toward the law he is
charged with violating, perhaps even toward his innocence. 8
The suggestion that coerced confessions not only may fail to separate
the innocent from the guilty but may also be psychologically harmful
is particularly relevant in juvenile law. Can the ideal of rehabilitation
be reconciled with a station house procedure which inspires confusion
in a child with respect to the police, the law and his own innocence?
It has been found, for instance, that the experiences of arrest, in-
terrogation and the juvenile court hearing leave many juveniles with
hostile feelings toward the police. One researcher's interviews with
boys on probation aged ten to sixteen years reflect this reaction.59
When the boys were asked about their feelings toward all those in-
volved in the process (judge, police, parents, and other youth authori-
ties), the most hostility was displayed toward the police.6" Many of
the boys had perceived the police as too hurried and as poor listeners.
This study of post-hearing interviews did not intend to prove any cause
and effect relationship between arrest and hostility, but it does suggest
that the experience of arrest and interrogation by the police may have a
detrimental effect on many children's attitude toward the law's right
arm.
Gault was also concerned with the possible untrustworthiness of
confessions unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. Psychologist Philip
Zimbardo believes, "Not only are police methods likely to make a guilty
man incriminate himself against his will, but I am convinced that they
also can lead to false confessions by the innocent . ... 61
57. Driver, supra note 43, at 61.
58. Id. at 46.
59. Snyder, The Impact of the Juvenile Court Hearings on the Child, 17
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 180, 183-184 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Snyder].
60. Id.
61. Zimbardo, Toward a More Perfect Justice, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 1967, at
45-46.
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The danger of inaccurate confessions may be exacerbated by the
process which determines which suspects are subjected to the most coer.
cive interrogation tactics. The Yale Interrogation Study revealed that
the questioning of suspects was usually a haphazard process whenever
the police already had adequate evidence against the accused and when
the crime was not serious. When the detectives felt they needed infor-
mation from the interrogation, however, especially for a serious crime,
the grilling was typically in the coercive manner feared by the Mir-
anda court. Another legal writer considering such confessions has ob-
served:
Extracting confessions in our police and prosecutorial practice has
become something like a universal folk ritual. In a large number
of the instances of crimes . . . reported to authorities . . . the
peace officers have no evidence against any individual acceptable
in court, or only weak evidence, or evidence of a crime of a
lower degree than they suspect has in fact occurred. But the of-
ficers know of persons in some way connected with the event:
family or associates, persons seen in the vicinity, men with records
suggesting that they are likely to have been involved in offenses
of the sort in question.62
Through the detention and interrogation of such suspects in the station
house, the police often succeed in obtaining the confession needed to
compensate for the weakness of their other evidence.61 Since the most
coercive tactics are employed in cases where corroborating evidence is
weakest,64 there is a significant likelihood that the leading questions
characteristic of high pressure interrogations may produce considerably
less accurate confessions. Such a result cannot be said to be proven
by the evidence presented here, but an experiment which could test this
hypothesis is suggested in the margin.6 5
62. Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HARv. L. REV. 21, 23 (1965) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Sutherland]. Similarly, Snyder reported from his inter-
views with delinquent children that those who had more than one encounter with police
often felt "that once they had been 'picked up' for something they were suspected of
having committed every subsequent offense in the neighborhood." Snyder, supra note
59, at 184.
63. Sutherland, supra note 62, at 23.
64. Yale Interrogation Study, supra note 40, at 1539.
65. To demonstrate the existence of unreliable confessions one must observe
confessions under several conditions. It is not practical to devise a direct measure of
reliability, so reliability must be inferred. One possible way of obtaining such a meas-
ure is by the following experiment:
Procedure: The experimenters would have to observe actual interrogations by the
police, as done in the Yale Interrogation Study, supra note 40. Before each interroga-
tion, the observers would have to question the detectives, in the absence of the ac-
cused, concerning their broad theory of the suspect's involvement in the crime and how
much evidence has already been gathered relative to the case. During the interrogation
itself the observer should then note both the degree of pressure exerted on the sus-
pect, as measured in the Yale Interrogation Study, and the extent to which the actual
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Regardless of the minor's guilt or innocence, an inaccurate report
of the events in question may seriously hamper a juvenile court judge
in proper disposition of the case. For instance, a judge employing the
ideal of the juvenile court philosophy66 would hesitate to accord identi-
cal treatment to a youngster who had simply "gone along" with friends
and one who had masterminded a plot. Yet, if an inaccurate confession
has been gained through coercion, the court may be misled and unable
to make such discriminations.
confession corresponds to the police's preconfession theory of the crime.
Possible results: The predicted results of the experiment would be that unreliable con-
fessions tend to occur more frequently when the police have only weak corroborating
evidence and the suspect is interrogated under high pressure. One way the experiment
could fail to show the predicted results would be if it were found that in cases where
there is weak corroborating evidence, the degree of pressure exerted on the suspects had
no effect on the number of confessions confirming the police's preconfession theory of
the crime. If the confession story is very similar to the police theory just as often un-
der low pressure as under high pressure present for weak evidence, or, similarly, when
there is strong evidence, then the experiment would not have shown that high pressure
produces less reliable confessions. If only pressure, or only the amount of evidence
turned out to have an effect on the number of confirming confessions, then the ex-
periment would fail to show the predicted result; it is the interaction of these two
variables which is of critical importance.
If the experiment does produce the predicted result, then it will be seen that when
there is weak evidence and high pressure, then more confessions will result in substan-
tiation of the detectives' preconfession theory than when there is weak evidence and
low pressure. The strong evidence condition would show little or no difference in the
varying levels of pressure. This interaction might occur if it is true that when there is
only weak evidence, and high pressure is exerted on the suspect, he tends to acquiesce
in the police's version of the event.
The predicted result can be shown graphically:
strong evidence
confessions
confirming
detectives'
preconfession weak
theory of the evidence
crime
Low High
Pressure
66. For a discussion of the original philosophy of juvenile law, see In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1967).
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Another potential result of subtly coercive interrogations is that
the confessor may become unable to remember the complete truth later.
An experiment conducted by psychologist Daryl Bem6 7 demonstrated
that subjects who have lied under circumstances in which they are ac-
customed to telling the truth show a tendency to misremember the truth
later. The act of lying at times generally associated with telling the
truth caused the subjects actually to believe the lie. Significantly, this
result occurs only when the coercion has been subtle; if the tactics used
to elicit the lie have been heavy-handed, the person does not believe his
lie because he has not been placed in a circumstance in which he is
accustomed to telling the truth.6" Relating his finding to criminal con-
fessions, Bern asserts:
It appears that the less a society uses [overtly] coercive tactics in
interrogation, the more susceptible the individual being interro-
gated becomes to thought control through self-persuasion. Indeed,
it could be argued from the conclusions of our research that there
is need for greater legal safeguards for the individual during the
police interrogation. 69
Some false confessions may be mere fantasies generated by a men-
tally disturbed individual. It is probably more frequent, however, that
crimes may be constructed out of behavior which, unknown to the
accused, the law does not consider culpable because of some extenu-
ating circumstance. An "assault" is not always an assault; perhaps
that moment had come when it became self-defense. A "rape" is not al-
ways a rape; there is often a thin line between consent and nonconsent.
Burglary requires not just breaking and entering, but such action with
an intent to commit a felony. Legal definitions of crimes often are not
as general in scope as public definitions. In response to an interroga-
tor's leading question, a suspect may confess that he committed an
assault without realizing that his act was not necessarily criminal. Yet,
Bem's data70 suggest that confessing the act's criminality distorts the
memory of the actual event, so that individual may not be able to re-
member the complete truth later. The suggestible suspect who re-
sponds affirmatively to leading interrogation questions may subse-
quently believe that his behavior was criminal, even if the law might
not have found it culpable.
The implications for the juvenile confessor are particularly dis-
turbing. The Yale Interrogation Study found a disproportionate num-
ber of young suspects among those who were subjected to the most co-
ercive tactics, possibly because juveniles often were questioned about
67. D. BEM, BELFs, ATTItuDEs, AND HUMAN APFAms 62-63 (1970).
68. Id.
69. Bern, When Saying is Believing, PSYcHOLOGY TODAY, July 1967, at 25 [here-
inafter cited as Bem].
70. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
February 19731 THE INTERROGATED JUVENILE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
more serious crimes.7 1 In light of the fact that juveniles possess per-
sonal qualities which make them among the most susceptible to subtle
coercion,7 Bem's prediction of self-persuasion becomes especially rele-
vant. It has been argued, however, that a child's "guilt" or "inno-
cence" is not an important consideration in the disposition of juvenile
cases."' The original philosophy of juvenile law held that actual guilt
was of secondary importance when compared to the "downward career"
of the child.7 1 It is this reasoning which justified use of the preponder-
ance of the evidence rule in juvenile courts rather than the adult crim-
inal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt r 5 The logical exten-
sion of this argument seems to imply that an inaccurate confession by
the child would not hinder the court in disposing of the case in the best
interest of the juvenile's future development. If, however, as a result
of making an inaccurate confession of criminality, the child now be-
lieves himself to be a criminal, his self-concept may have been per-
manently affected.
Inaccurate Confessions: How Likely?
Data on the number of false or inaccurate confessions tradition-
ally have been difficult to obtain. If the self-persuasion process has in
fact been frequently operative, verification of an inaccurate confession
would be difficult since a confession's accuracy usually would not be
subject to later challenge. The only definitive proof of the existence
of false confessions must come from cases where other evidence unequiv-
ocally disproves the confessor's guilt. Such cases are understandably
rare, but those which do get reported give cause to consider the impact
of the phenomenon. For example, in In re Carlo, two boys, thirteen
and fifteen years old, were arrested and interrogated concerning the
murder of a young girl. The boys confessed, including such details as
beating and sexually assaulting her. The autopsy and other uncon-
troverted evidence at the trial showed that no such beating or sexual
assault had ever taken place.76 Another example is In re Gregory. In
that case, two twelve year old boys confessed to the murder of an aged
housekeeper in a New York mansion and actually reenacted the crime
for the police. It was later shown that one of the boys had been locked
in a mental ward of a hospital at the time the crime was committed. 77
71. Yale Interrogation Study, supra note 40, at 1561.
72. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
73. See the discussion of this philosophy in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
74. Id.
75. See In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 454, 450 P.2d 296, 301, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1,
6 (1969).
76. In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 231-33, 225 A.2d 110, 113-15 (1966).
77. In re Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 59, 224 N.E.2d 102, 104, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675,
678 (1966).
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Finally, in In re Garland, a fifteen year old boy was apprehended be-
cause he was on the street at a late hour. Although he was not at
that time linked with any crime, the police interrogated him extensively.
He confessed to several crimes, including a burglary, for which there
was no other significant evidence. The court observed that it was
physically impossible for the boy to have removed the property involved
in the burglary.78
Such cases, incredible at first blush, are more plausible in light
of the empirical studies which have been reviewed here. We are re-
minded that "the mind of man is malleable, the gentle art of persua-
sion can be the gloved hand of thought control, and beliefs are some-
times fragile things. 79  It is apparent that minors, at the very least,
should be protected from a process which may leave a youth confused
"about his feelings toward the police, toward the law he is charged
with violating, perhaps even toward his innocence."8' 0
Conclusion
The landmark decisions of Miranda and Gault promulgated poli-
cies whose implementation is still largely unresolved. The right of the
juvenile suspect in California to receive the Miranda warnings and the
accompanying right of refusing to waive these constitutional rights are
not effective as safeguards against coercion. Since there are strong
internal and external pressures compelling the individual to waive his
right; the power of refusal is an illusory one.
The dilemma of a minor faced with police interrogators is that
if the youth is assertive enough to refuse to waive his constitutional
rights, the refusal itself will virtually eliminate all possibility of release
or other leniency. On the other hand, if the juvenile is submissive, he
may emerge from the interrogation experience with increased hostility to-
ward the police and confusion about the nature of his own guilt or
innocence. A juvenile suspect's "power" of nonwaiver is a "heads they
win, tails he loses" phenomenon.
Moreover, the legal and psychological literature reviewed here
strongly indicates that the suggestible juveniles, who are least likely to
assert their Miranda rights through nonwaiver or another unmistakable
act, are those in greatest need of protection from the leading questions
of interrogators. People v. Burton attempts to deal with this problem
by emphasizing the second Miranda requirement, which prohibits the
continued interrogation of suspects after they have expressed reluctance
to talk. The Burton decision recognizes that a juvenile's expression of
78. In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340, 344 (Ct. App. La. 1964).
79. Bern, supra note 69, at 22.
80. Driver, supra note 43, at 46.
his unwillingness to forego his right to silence may be buried in a re-
quest to see his father. This decision must not be constrained by its
facts and the analogy which the court saw between a boy asking to see
his father and an adult requesting to see an attorney. Burton also re-
lies upon Randall's broad present willingness test, under which a wide
range of words and acts expressing hesitation would arguably be in-
cluded.8
The interdisciplinary approach affords an opportunity to appre-
ciate both the breadth of the problem of coercion and the necessity that
it be resolved. Much of the psychological literature has suggested that
extensive damage may result from coerced confessions-damage which
may never be undone even if the confession is later ruled inadmissible as
evidence. For this reason, it is hoped that the court will continue to
develop the Randall test with its emphasis on observable behavior
rather than upon an abstract condition, such as fundamental fairness.
A test which focuses upon behavior gives more specific guidance to
police and to lower courts. Finally, it is hoped that the court will ex-
pand the Burton principle that a juvenile may be less sophisticated
than an adult in an expression of his desire to assert his Fifth Amend-
ment right against self incrimination.
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